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The political and economic impact of country size has been a fre-
quently discussed issue in social science. In accordance with the general
hypothesis of Montesquieu, this paper demonstrates that there is a ro-
bust negative relationship between the size of country territory and a
measure of the rule of law for a large cross-section of countries. We
propose that there are two main reasons for this regularity; ﬁrstly that
institutional quality often has the character of a local public good that
is imperfectly spread across space from the capital to the hinterland,
and secondly that a large territory usually is accompanied by valuable
rents that tend to distort property rights institutions. Our empirical
analysis further shows that whether the capital is centrally or periph-
erally located within the country matters for the average level of rule
of law.
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Montesquieu.
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”It is in the nature of a republic that it should have a small
territory; without that, it could scarcely exist. In a large repub-
lic, there are large fortunes, and consequently little moderation
of spirit...
In a large republic, the common good is sacriﬁced to a thou-
sand considerations; it is subordinated to various exceptions; it
depends on accidents. In a small republic, the public good is
more strongly felt, better known, and closer to each citizen...”
(From The Spirit of Laws, C.L. Montesquieu, 1750, Book
VIII)
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11 Introduction
We demonstrate that there is a robust negative relationship between the size
of country territory and the strength of rule of law for a large cross-section
of countries. We also show that the internal location of the capital matters
for the geographical spreading of institutions. In the spirit of Montesquieu,
we argue that there are two basic reasons for these results; ﬁrstly that large
countries tend to be endowed with sizeable potential rents that distort the
incentives of the regime, and secondly that the rule of law has the character
of a local public good that is imperfectly broadcast from the country capital
to the hinterland.
The importance of country size for social development has been a topic
among political philosophers for centuries. Both Plato and Aristotle pre-
ceded Montesquieu arguing that small nations like the Greek city states
were naturally superior to larger entities and that a country’s entire terri-
tory should not be larger than that it could be surveyed from a hill. Likewise,
Rousseau later claimed that small states prosper ”...simply because they are
small, because all their citizens know each other and keep an eye on each
other, and because their rulers can see for themselves the harm that is being
done and the good that is theirs to do...” (Rousseau, quoted in Rose, 2005).
The opposite argument, that the diversity of preferences and the eﬀects
of fractionalization are more easily handled within large countries, was pro-
posed by both David Hume and James Madison.1 Later inﬂuential works
like Dahl and Tufte (1973) and Alesina and Spolaore (2003) have tended
to think of the problem as encompassing a trade-oﬀ where small countries
have advantages in terms of democratic participation and preference homo-
geneity, whereas smallness on the other hand implies higher per capita costs
of non-rival public goods, a small internal market, and that small countries
easily might be partitioned or swallowed by larger countries with a greater
military capacity. The latter argument appears to have been particularly
relevant for the European continent (Tilly, 1990).
Within the economics discipline, the relationship between country size
and economic performance has not rendered a lot of attention. Early en-
dogenous growth models like Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)
1See Dahl and Tufte (1973), Alesina and Spolaore (2003), and Rose (2005) for reviews
of the older literature.
2included a prediction that larger countries should grow faster because they
had a larger pool of potential innovators. On the whole, these early models
did not receive strong empirical support.2 Alesina et al (1998) show that
large countries tend to have large governments and that they are less open to
trade than smaller countries. Using the level of the population as the mea-
sure of country size, Rose (2005) fails to ﬁnd any systematic eﬀect of size
on a range of institutional and economic performance variables. Dahl and
Tufte (1973) is probably the most comprehensive study of the importance
of country size and is one of few studies that actually considers country area
as a potential determinant of economic outcomes.
A few articles focus on the endogenous determination of country size. In
Friedman (1977), it is assumed that the size of tax revenues increases with
country territory and that tax revenue-maximizing rulers therefore invest
in extending their territory. In the end, this process will actually result
in an equilibrium where rulers maximize their joint potential net revenue.
In Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003), country size is endogenously deter-
mined as a result of a trade-oﬀ where large countries have economies of scale
in public goods provision but a greater degree of preference heterogeneity.
Wittman (2000) extends this framework by allowing for migration between
countries in the spirit of Tiebout (1956).
The generality of the endogenous borders literature has been questioned
by Herbst (2000).3 Although the endogenous borders literature is useful for
understanding the European experience or developments over the very long
run, it appears to have less to oﬀer an analysis of politics in former colonies
where borders were usually ﬁxed by colonial powers and subsequently rarely
changed. Indeed, Herbst argues that the exogenously given and more or
less random conﬁguration of borders in Africa must be a central feature in
2Kremer’s (1993) extreme long-run analysis of population growth on diﬀerent conti-
nents is sometimes viewed as giving some support to the ’scale-eﬀect’ prediction, but it
was eﬀectively refuted by the evidence in Jones (1995) and led to the development of
growth models without scale eﬀects.
3In Herbst’s (2000, p 141) own words: "...the intertia of the national experience and
the incentives posed by international structures and norms that have developed over time
combine to make the demarcation of the state a non-issue in most countries most of the
time. Here, I diﬀer greatly from writings by economists who seek to ﬁnd the optimal
number of states by assuming that states cooperate to design themselves in a way that
will maximize ’their joint potential net revenue’ [Friedman] or who believe that the size
and shape of states is determined on the basis of majority votes motivated by precise
calculations of economic interests [Alesina and Spolaore]"
3comparative analyses of African politics.
In this article, we show that the size of country territory is negatively
associated with a range of institutional measures such as rule of law, po-
litical stability, and corruption when using a sample of all countries in the
world. We recognize however that boundaries are potentially endogenous
and therefore restrict our analysis to former colonies whose borders were
exogenously determined by the colonial powers. In a theoretical section, we
argue that country size has two eﬀects: Firstly, that a large territory means
a larger absolute value of expected rents from lands and mines and that
this stock of appropriable treasures makes self-interested autocratic rulers
less interested in upholding strong private property rights and protection
against expropriation. Secondly, that the strong concentration of power in
the capitals of former colonies implies that public goods like the rule of law
diﬀuse according to a spatial decay-function so that the levels felt in the
hinterland are much weaker than in the capitals. This problem should be
further exacerbated in countries where the capital is non-centrally located.
As the base sample for testing our hypotheses, we use data from 127
former colonies which - unlike most of the previous literature on colonialism
- arguably contains all large and small countries that were ever colonized.
We show that the size of country territory has a very robust negative impact
on our measure of the rule of law, even after controlling for distance from
the equator, openness to trade, settler mortality, ethnic fractionalization,
colonial origin, continental dummies, and a number of other variables. We
also show that country territory appears to have a stronger association with
rule of law than the level of the population. This fact, together with the
general endogeneity of population size to institutions, suggest to us that
country territory is a more appropriate indicator of country size than pop-
ulation. Unlike any other study that we are aware of, we further construct
two indicators of the peripherality of the capital. As hypothesized, it turns
out that when we hold country territory and some other controls constant,
the strength of rule of law decreases with our size-neutral measure of the
peripherality of the capital. Our interpretation of these results is that ex-
ogenously determined country territory has been a major impediment to
the creation of strong institutions in large countries like Indonesia, Sudan,
and Algeria, whereas it has been highly beneﬁcial to small countries like
Bahrain, Martinique, and Singapore.
4Since the strength of rule of law is a kind of institutional variable, our
approach is obviously highly related to the growing empirical literature on
the determinants of institutional strength (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu
et al, 2001, 2002; Rodrik et al, 2004). In the spirit of Glaeser et al (2004),
we think of property rights institutions and the rule of law as a variable
that governments actually can inﬂuence, at least in the medium run. In
the theory section, an important assumption is that post-colonial regimes
are capable and willing to undertake institutional change, although the im-
pact of such policies depend on the colonial and pre-colonial institutional
environment. This type of modelling therefore distinguishes our approach
somewhat from works in the tradition of Douglass North such as Acemoglu
et al (2001, 2002) where institutional persistence from colonial times is a
central element.
The article is organized as follows: In section two, we give a general
outline of the statistical correlations between country size and various in-
dicators of institutional quality. In section three, we develop a theoretical
framework for understanding the linkages between size and institutions. In
section four, we provide the main empirical investigation using the reduced
sample of former colonies. Section ﬁve concludes the exposition.
2 Country Size and Institutions
Country size is negatively associated with a range of measures of institutional
quality. In Table 1, we use six diﬀerent measures as dependent variables,
capturing various types of institutions that are believed to be central for
economic development. The six indicators are Rule of Law, Political Stabil-
ity, Voice and Accountability, Government Eﬀectiveness, Regulatory Quality,
and Corruption for the year 2004, collected by Kaufmann et al (2005) (for
a description of all variables, see the Data Appendix). As our measure of
country size, we use LogArea, which shows the logged value of the total area
of a country (including lakes and rivers) in square kilometers. The sample
includes just above 200 countries, some of which are very small like Macau
and Singapore.
As Table 1 shows, the coeﬃcient for LogArea is negative and highly signif-
icant for all six dependent institutional variables. LogArea has its strongest
impact on Rule of Law and Political Stability. In the latter case, LogA-
5rea alone explains roughly 25 percent of the variation, which we think is a
quite remarkable result but perhaps not surprising. It seems for instance
natural that a large country is more likely to host rebel movements than
small ones. However, the ﬁt is substantially improved when we include Lati-
tude, which measures absolute distance from the equator in latitude degrees,
and a dummy for Neo-Europe which captures the inﬂuence of four outliers
United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Especially the ﬁrst
three countries are anomalies in our investigation since they are very large
countries far from the equator with good institutions. The dummy is highly
signiﬁcant in all columns, as is Latitude. Latitude is often included in em-
pirical investigations of this kind and is believed to capture geographical,
agricultural, and disease-related factors (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et
al, 2001; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005). Figure 1 shows the partial scatter plot
between LogArea and Rule of law (controlling for Latitude and Neo-Europe).
The reduced form regressions in Table 1 show that country size seems to
be strongly correlated with various types of institutional quality. However,
the estimates do not tell us much about the causal mechanisms behind the
results. Indeed, we suspect that the precise causal mechanism depends on
what particular institutional variable we are considering. Therefore, we will
henceforth focus more deeply on the variable that has attracted the greatest
interest in the literature; Rule of law.
Another issue concerns the potential endogeneity of country size. In the
theoretical model of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), country size is endoge-
nously determined as a result of a trade-oﬀ between economies of scale in
public goods provision and preference heterogeneity among the population.
All else equal, large countries tend to have low costs per capita of public
goods (like rule of law) but also people in the periphery who would prefer
a diﬀerent government policy. If this model is correct, then it would be
inappropriate to include LogArea as an exogenous variable as in Table 1.
The generality of Alesina and Spolaore’s view on country formation has
been questioned by Herbst (2000). Although the type of process envisaged
by Alesina and Spolaore probably has been in place in Europe and parts
of Asia where country formation has been going on for centuries or even
millennia, the same cannot be said of the former colonies in America and
Africa that received independence much more recently. Herbst (2000) argues
that for Africa in particular, the size and number of countries was organized
6in a more or less random manner during the infamous Berlin conference of
1885. First of all there was relatively little a priori information for boundary
creators due to a lack of traditional boundaries as well as natural geographic
boundaries. Ultimately, the Berlin conference made it possible to claim
sovereignty over an area regardless of the ability to administer the area.
Therefore, there was no discrimination enabling only the more powerful
colonizers to claim large areas. The logic of the partition was primarily
to serve European strategic interests and the colonial powers more or less
ignored existing state structures and ethnic boundaries (Pakenham, 1991).4
Indeed, the wider eﬀects of the random nature of African borders has been a
major topic among Africanists (Davidson, 1992; Englebert et al, 2002). The
endogeneity of borders can also be questioned for the other former colonies,
although there are some examples of country break-ups after independence.5
The implication of the discussion above is that while it might be prob-
lematic to consider country size as fully exogenous in Europe and parts of
Asia, this should not constitute a serious problem for former colonies. In
the further theoretical and empirical analysis, we will therefore only consider
the relationship between country size and rule of law in countries that were
previously colonized.
3 A Theoretical Framework
In the model below, we aim to describe certain features of the political
economy and institutional environment of a former colony with exogenous,
randomly distributed borders instituted by the previous colonial power.6
The size of country territory is imagined to have two eﬀects on the average
level of rule of law: Firstly, a direct ’broadcasting-eﬀect’ that derives from
many formal institutions’ character of a local public good originating in the
4In Jackson and Rosberg’s (1985, p 46) words: "The boundaries of many countries,
particularly but by no means exclusively in French-speaking Africa, were arbitrarily drawn
by the colonial powers and were not encouraging frameworks of uniﬁed, legitimate, and
capable states."
5Well-known incidences of break-ups of colonies include the formation of India, Pak-
istan, and Bangladesh in 1949 and of Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador in 1830. However,
all the countries mentioned had their break-up in conjunction with or very soon after inde-
pendence and post-colonial developments have therefore had at most a very small impact
on border formation.
6The model is not at all intended to capture the situation in the Neo-European former
colonies. As in the empirical section, the historical trajectories of Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United States are anomalies to the theory below.
7country capital. Secondly, an indirect ’rent seeking-eﬀect’ such that larger
countries tend to be endowed with a larger amount of primary sector rents,
which in turn decreases government incentives towards maintaining strong
property rights.
3.1 The Broadcasting Eﬀect
We propose that rule of law has the basic character of a local public good
that emanates from the capital of the country and where the eﬀective level
of the good declines with geographical distance from the capital. As noted
above, we see a number of reasons for making this assumption.
Firstly, it is a very common assertion in the literature that both ex-
ecutive and legislative power in the newly independent colonies tended to
originate almost exclusively from the capitals (Bates, 1981; Herbst, 2000).
Following the old colonial logic, whoever controlled the capital was usu-
ally also internationally recognized as the legitimate regime. Given the lack
of democracy and the non-existence of strong regional identities or federal
states, the maintenance of rule of law remained highly centralized.7
Secondly, it is also often discussed how the ’broadcasting of power over
space’ in former colonies is associated with signiﬁcant challenges, particu-
larly in Africa (Herbst, 2000). Public goods like the legislation and enforce-
ment of property rights were most strongly felt in and around the capital
among the elite groups that controlled the state. In this sense, we argue that
institutions tend to be local public goods in a similar sense as for instance
knowledge production and R&D.
Thirdly, even if the broadcasting of institutions had been smooth across
geography, it is usually the case that the sympathy for the ruling elite and its
laws decrease with distance from the capital. Alesina and Spolaore (1997)
make a similar assumption but with the size of the population rather than
geographical distance as the source of preference discordance. In any case,
distance from the capital should be negatively associated with the strength
of law enforcement and with the willingness of local people to comply with
the rules endorsed by the elite in the capital.
In order to formalize this idea, let us imagine that the strength of rule
of law in the capital of country i is given by a variable zi. Let us also
7There are of course exceptions to this generalization. India is a well-known example
of a democratic country with strong regional autonomy.
8imagine, as in Alesina and Spolaore (1997), that the size and location of
countries in the world can be described as non-overlapping intervals on the
real line where si > 0 is the size of country i and where [li,li + si] ⊂ R+
deﬁnes the unique country location with li > 0 as the ’coordinate’ for the
left-hand side border.8 The capital of the country, in turn, is located at
a point ci ∈ [li,li + si]. Obviously, if the capital is located exactly in the
middle of the country, it will be found at ci = li + si/2. The geographical
distance from the capital to some location li,j ∈ [li,li + si] within country i
is described by the term di,j = |li,j − ci| ∈ [0,si] (see Figure 2 for a graphical
illustration).
A central assumption of our model is that the size distribution of former
colonies was determined by a random, exogenous process. The former as-
sumption is of course an important departure from the endogenous borders-
models by Friedman (1977) and Alesina and Spolaore (1997) but is well
in line with the literature on the history and political development of ex-
colonies (Herbst, 2000; Englebert et al, 2002). We further make the implicit
assumption that within countries, the population is randomly distributed
across space.
As discussed above, we postulate that the strength of rule of law dimin-
ishes with distance from the capital according to a spatial decay-function
zi,j = zi (1 − aidi,j) (1)
where zi,j is the level of rule of law at location li,j and where ai > 0 is a
parameter describing the marginal decline in institutional quality over space.
The level of ai is assumed to be such that aisi < 1.9
If we deﬁne the average distance to the capital within a country as ¯ di,
we can calculate this measure as a weighted average
¯ di =
(ci − li)




8The one-dimensional nature of country size is used for simplicity. As shown by Alesina
and Spolaore (1997), modelling size as two-dimensional signiﬁcantly increases the com-
plexity of calculations without any intuitive gains.
9This condition is imposed to ensure that zi,j > 0 at all li,j. The same type of spatial
decay-function for public goods is used by Arzaghi and Henderson (2005). ’Iceberg’ func-
tions in spatial economics and in the ’new economic geography’ is discussed for instance
by Krugman (1998).
9This distance function can assume two extreme values. The ﬁrst is given by
the situation when the capital is located exactly in the middle of the country
so that ci = li+si/2. In this case, simple algebra shows that ¯ di = si
4 . In the
other extreme case with the capital located at either of the two borders, we
will have that ¯ di = si






where qi ∈ [0,1] is a size-neutral index of the ’peripherality’ of the capital
where a high qi indicates a location near (or at) a border and where a low
qi means a location near (or at) the center of the country.
3.2 The Rent Seeking-Eﬀect
The level of institutional quality in the capital zi is to a large extent given
by the colonial and pre-colonial history of the country, as argued by North
(1990), Acemoglu et al (2001, 2002) and others. However, in the general
spirit of Glaeser et al (2004) and the model in Congdon Fors and Olsson
(2005), we argue that the institutional setup was partly also a choice variable
for the post-colonial regimes.
In order to capture both of these features, we make a distinction between
historical (pre-colonial and colonial) property rights institutions with an
average strength of x and endogenously determined current (post-colonial)
institutions z. After independence, discontinuous breaks with the colonial
regime were often made, which is the reason why we think of x and z as
diﬀerent variables. However, as will be shown, the choice of z will partly
depend on the historical level x.
We propose that autocratic post-colonial regimes typically faced a trade-
oﬀ between fostering strong or weak property rights institutions, i.e. a high
or a low level of z. Strong property rights and a pervasive rule of law
tended to favor the growth of a modern, export-oriented manufacturing
sector that was dependent on highly mobile foreign investments and capital.
However, a strong rule of law also served as a signiﬁcant constraint on the
regime and made rent extraction from a primary sector more diﬃcult.10 The
10We recognize of course that all former colonies are not characterized by non-
democratic, self-interested rulers that maximize their own rents. However, we strongly
believe that this generalization is more appropriate for this category of countries than it
would be to include a benevolent social planner. Our model has some similarities to the
10primary sector in our model includes industries such as agriculture as well
as various types of mineral extraction, including oil. The common feature
of these economic activities is that they rely on a highly immobile factor of
production (land and mines) and therefore tend to be less sensitive to the
institutional environment in the country.11 Furthermore, there is generally
a positive relationship between the magnitude of primary sector rents and
the area of the country.12
We capture this reasoning formally by modelling a utility function for
an autocratic ruling regime of the following appearance:
Ui = m(xi,zi) + bir(xi,zi,si) (4)
The regime receives utility from private rents from manufacturing m and
from a primary sector r. xi measures the level of institutional quality given
by colonial and pre-colonial history, whereas zi indicates the endogenously
created institutions after independence. The parameter bi reﬂects the rel-
ative weight given to the primary sector in country i for historical or for
power strategic reasons not explained by the model.13
In line with the discussion above, we assume that
∂m(xi,zi)
∂zi = mz > 0
and that
∂r(xizi,si)
∂zi = rz < 0. In order to understand the intuition behind
the signs of these derivatives, consider the following example. Imagine that
under the prevailing property rights institutions, a regime in some former
colony captures rents by randomly expropriating 5 percent of ﬁrm revenues
in the two sectors in the name of the state but for personal gain. Let us
further assume that total revenues in each of the two sectors initially are 100
units so that rents are 5 units in each sector. An improvement in property
rights institutions then occurs which manifests itself in a lowering of the
chapter in Alesina and Spolaore (2003) featuring the optimization problem of a dictatorial
’Leviathan’.
11The least sensitive type of natural resource production is probably low tech mining of
for instance alluvial diamonds and gold. Such mining has often prevailed in Africa even
during periods of a general institutional collapse (Olsson, 2005). It should be acknowledged
that certain types of natural resource production - like oil drilling and oﬀ-shore diamond
mining - typically involves advanced technology and a dependency on foreign capital, as
in the manufacturing sector.
12Casual observation certainly suggests that large former colonies like the United States,
Brazil, DR Congo, Angola, and Nigeria are well endowed with natural resources.
13In Congdon Fors and Olsson (2005), it was argued that bi gave an indication of the
origins of the elite that came into power after independence. In many cases, this elite
had very weak ties to the manufacturing sector and tended to favor the natural resource
sectors.
11percentage of revenue expropriated in the two sectors from 5 to 4 percent.
In the manufacturing sector, which relies on internationally mobile capital
and investments, this good signal has a strong impact on total production
that increases to 130. The eﬀective level of rents therefore actually increases
to become 5.2 units. In the primary sector, with highly immobile invest-
ments, production increases but only by a relatively small amount to 110
units. Eﬀective primary sector rents fall from 5 to 4.4 units. In this rep-
resentative example, manufacturing rents thus turn out to have a positive
relationship with the strength of property rights, whereas the reverse is true
in the primary sector.14
We further make the implicit assumption that natural resources are dis-
tributed randomly over space, which implies that the absolute level of ex-
pected primary sector rents increases with the territory of the country. In
order to avoid extra notation, we capture this idea by simply assuming
∂r(xi,zi,si)
∂si = rs > 0. The same eﬀect of space is not present in the manufac-
turing sector. All else equal, the utility of the regime thus always increases
with territory.15 The logic of the model further suggests that the marginal
utility of extra territory should decrease with the strength of the rule of
law since rent appropriation by the elite is more diﬃcult if private property
rights are strong, implying
∂2r(xi,zi,si)
∂si∂zi = rsz < 0.
The historical experience given by xi shapes expectations about current
behavior and exacerbates the marginal impact of a current institutional pol-
icy. In the numerical example above, the decrease in expropriation risk
from 5 to 4 percent implied an increase in revenues with 30 units. In a
country with favorable historical institutions, the reaction of an identical
change in expropriation risk should be even greater, maybe increasing pro-
duction to 150 and rents to 6 units. Likewise, production in the primary
sector should be more responsive to a current institutional change, maybe
increasing to 120 rather than to 110. Rents would then be 4.8 rather than
4.4. In other words, a stronger institutional heritage means that the posi-
tive marginal eﬀect of increasing zi increases with xi in the manufacturing
14Note, however, that a rational rent-maximizing regime (with bi = 1) would never
choose to carry out this strengthening of institutions since the overall eﬀect is a fall in
rents from 10 to 9.6 units.
15If size had been a choice variable, all autocratic rulers in our model would thus have
liked to increase the size of their country but would of course have been constrained by a
similar desire among other dictatorial rulers, as in Friedman (1977).
12sector, whereas the negative marginal eﬀect of increasing zi decreases with
xi in the primary sector. Formally, this implies that
∂2m(xi,zi)
∂zi∂xi = mzx > 0
and
∂2r(xi,zi,si)
∂zi∂xi = rzx > 0.
A key feature of our model further concerns the relationship between xi
and si. In line with the exogeneity of si discussed above, we argue that xi
had no impact on si, i.e. pre-colonial and colonial institutions did generally
not aﬀect the size distribution of countries. We recognize, however, that
there could be a causal link from si to xi such that the conﬁguration of
colonial institutions in the capital depended on the total size of colonial
territory. It is not clear though what direction this inﬂuence would take
among colonialists of diﬀerent identity and in general we believe that the
colonial rulers mainly cared about the situation in or near the capital.
Unlike in the framework of Alesina and Spolaore (1997), the choice vari-
able in our model is the quality of a public good like the rule of law rather
than country size. Another diﬀerence is that we do not believe that it is
natural to assume economies of scale in public goods provision when area is
the measure of country size. For simplicity, we also abstract from the costs
of institutional change.16 The only constraint facing the regime is that the
rule of law must not fall below a certain reservation level zmin. If it does,
the people will overthrow the incumbent.
The ruling regime thus faces an optimization problem
max
zi
m(xi,zi) + bir(xi,zi,si) subject to zi ≥ zmin.
If we disregard the possibility of a boundary solution, the (interior) equi-
librium level of rule of law or property rights institutions z∗
i is implicitly
given by the ﬁrst-order condition mz +birz = 0. In order to have an interior
solution, it is further required that the second-order condition for maximum









Since we have already established that the denominator must be negative,
it will be the case that
∂z∗
i
∂si < 0. We argue that this type of indirect negative
16The cost of institutional change is explicitly modelled in Congdon Fors and Olsson
(2005). Naturally, costs of institutional change would imply that there is a bias toward
keeping the institutions inherited from colonial days.
13relationship between institutional quality and territorial size is similar in









mzz+birzz > 0. These results might be
summarized by writing z∗
i (xi,bi,si).
The equations above imply that the average strength of rule of law in a
country i will be given by:17








The central insight from this expression is that rule of law will diminish
with country size via two potential channels. The ﬁrst direct ’broadcasting-
eﬀect’ comes about due to the imperfect enforcement of institutions over
space. This eﬀect can however be mitigated by a low marginal decline of
institutional quality ai and by a centrally placed capital (a low qi). The
second indirect ’rent seeking-eﬀect’ works via the level of primary sector
rents that increases with country size and that tend to corrupt governmental
institutional policy. The level of institutions will further be lower if the
regime considers primary sector rents to be particularly valuable so that bi
is high. Given all other variables, we also have institutional persistence such
that current average institutional strength increases with past institutions
xi, as in much of the existing literature. Equation (6) will form the basis
for the further empirical investigation in the next section.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data and empirical speciﬁcation
Due to the potential endogeneity of country size, we use a restricted sample
of 127 former colonies - colonized between 1462 and 1922 following the ex-
pansion of Western Europe - that we have identiﬁed among the 208 countries
listed in Kaufmann et al (2005). Borders in former colonies have rarely been
changed since colonial days and might reasonably be regarded as an exoge-
nous variable in economic development. Some of the countries in our sample
are very small both in terms of population and territory (for instance Nauru
17We might equivalently think of the expression in (6) as showing the expected quality of
institutions for a randomly chosen individual (since individuals are randomly distributed
across space).
14with a population of roughly 12,000 individuals on 21 square kilometers) and
some are still dependencies to their old colonial powers. Many cross-country
studies exclude such tiny countries, but given the issue at hand, they are
relevant observations in our study.18 Our sample is by far the largest sample
of former colonies in the literature and arguably includes all countries that
were ever colonized.
The basic equation that we test in this section with many variations is
given in (7)
Zi = α0 + α1Si + α2Qi + C￿
iα3 + ￿i (7)
where Zi is the measure of Rule of law in country i, Si is our country size
variable (mainly LogArea), Qi is our measure of the peripherality of the
capital in the country, C￿
i is a vector of control variables, ￿i is the normally
distributed error term, and αk (with k = {0,1,2,3}) are the estimated
coeﬃcients.
The main variable of interest here is of course Si. We do not believe that
it is practically possible to disentangle empirically a direct and an indirect
eﬀect of country size as in eq. (6) and we therefore only specify a reduced-
form relationship in (7). Our hypothesis is obviously that α1 < 0. The
peripherality measure Qi is our equivalent of qi in (6). We are not aware
of any other study that has tried to measure or estimate the impact of the
peripherality of the capital on institutions or indeed on any other economic
variable. We expect to ﬁnd that α2 < 0. The control variables in C￿
i will
always include Latitude and Neo-Europe as in Table 1, but also a number
of other variables suggested in the literature. The motivation for including
Latitude is partially that it can be regarded as a proxy for the marginal
’spatial cost’ of broadcasting institutions, ai.19 A Neo-Europe-dummy is
included since these four countries are extreme outliers and do not ﬁt well
into our basic framework. We will also include various proxies for colonial
institutions xi such that Acemoglu et al´s (2001) Settler Mortality-variable,
although this reduces our number of observations by almost one half. Lastly,
bi will be considered as a deep parameter that we do not attempt to control
18In section 4.4, we show that our main results are robust when we control for de-
pendencies and exclude the smallest countries as well as those with the most uncertain
data.
19See Diamond (1997), Herbst (2000), and Olsson and Hibbs (2005) for general treat-
ments and Sachs (2001) for a more detailed discussion of the economic and institutional
diﬃculties that are faced by governments near the equator.
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4.2 The Size Variable
Before we carry out our basic task of estimating (7), we will make a digression
on what country size variable Si that should be included. In the tradition
of Alesina and Spolaore (1997, 2003) most studies have used the level of
the population as the indicator of country size. In a recent paper, Rose
(2005) investigates whether the level of the population has an impact on a
battery of economic and institutional variables and ﬁnds that it has no or,
at best, a very weak eﬀect. We argue that unlike country area, the level
of the population is in general endogenous to economic and institutional
environments, sometimes even in the short run.20 Nonetheless, we include
the level of the population as a regressor in Table 2 to check whether country
area or population size can best explain variations in the rule of law.
To begin with, column (1) shows that LogArea is still a very strong
predictor of Rule of law even in this sample, and together with the two
primary controls (with unreported but highly signiﬁcant estimates as in
Table 1), it explains nearly 54 percent of the variation in the dependent
variable (see Figure 3 for a partial scatter plot). If we were to interpret these
results, a 100 percent increase in total area for any country would imply a
reduction in the Rule of Law-index by 0.169 points, which translates into
about 3.9 percent of the whole dispersion between the highest possible score
and the lowest possible score. This relatively small eﬀect is explained by
that countries diﬀer drastically in size.21 If we instead compare a country
with a total area of 1,000 square kilometers (about the size of Hong Kong)
with a country with an area of 1,000,000 square kilometers (like Mauretania
or Bolivia), the model predicts that all else equal the larger country should
have a score on Rule of law that is 1.17 points lower, which is clearly a large
eﬀect.
Column (2) shows that LogPop (the natural logarithm of the level of the
20There are several recent examples of episodes when the population has changed dras-
tically as a result of institutional failures. In 1994, 800,000 Tutsi were slaughtered in
Rwanda as a result of a collapse of the rule of law. The older experiences of Nazi Ger-
many and Stalin’s Soviet Union are well-known examples of how bad institutions have a
very large impact on the level of the population.
21India, one of the largest countries in our sample, is about 130’000 times larger than
Macau, which is one of the smallest countries in our sample.
16population) is also negative and signiﬁcant when included alone, but its ex-
planatory power is much lower.22 When included together with LogArea in
column (5), LogPop is insigniﬁcant and changes sign whereas LogArea has
almost exactly the same coeﬃcient as before. Given the high correlation
between LogArea and LogPop, one should of course not take the speciﬁc
estimate seriously, but column (5) appears to indicate that even when hold-
ing population constant, Rule of law diminishes with country territory and
retains its signiﬁcance.
Table 2 also includes two other variables that are believed to be strongly
associated with country size; population density in logs (LogPopDens) and
a measure of the country’s degree of openness (LogOpen) where the latter
is measured in the conventional way as imports plus exports as a share of
GDP.23 One might expect that a public good like the rule of law is more
eﬃciently spread in a country with a high average population density in
its territory. Column (3) conﬁrms that LogPopDens is positively related
to Rule of law. Of course, since population density is calculated as total
population divided by total area, it does not make sense to run LogPopDens
against LogArea.
A third variable that is highly related to country size is Openness. As
Alesina et al (1998) and others have argued, small countries are naturally
more open than larger countries that have major internal markets. In accor-
dance with what is usually hypothesized in the literature, Table 2 suggests
that a high degree of openness appears to act as a disciplining device for
countries to uphold strong property rights and judicial constraints against
opportunistic behavior by governments and individuals. The estimate in
column (4) is positive and highly signiﬁcant and the estimate is still signif-
icant when LogArea is included in column (6). This does not much aﬀect
the negative estimate for LogArea.
Lastly, in column (7) we consider the idea that territorial size might
actually in part determine the level of the population. In a two-stage pro-
cedure, we ﬁrst run a regression with LogPop as the dependent variable and
LogArea as the regressor. We then use the residuals from this estimation as
22This result stands in sharp contrast to the main tendency in Rose (2005) who ﬁnds
no robust association between population size and a number of institutional and economic
variables.
23See for instance Dahl and Tufte (1973) for an insightful discussion of how population
density and openness to trade are related to country area and total population.
17the independent variable and Rule of law as the dependent one. We thus
exploit the variation in the level of the population that is not explained by
country area. The estimate for LogPop in column (7) is then negative but
non-signiﬁcant.
The main conclusion from Table 2 is that LogArea is the superior predic-
tor of Rule of Law among the size-related measures. We recognize however
that the chain of causality might partially run through LogPop, LogPopDens,
and Openness to institutional quality. In the remaining estimations, we will
run regressions where we do not include the other three size indicators but
where the reasoning above should be kept in mind.
4.3 The Centrality of the Capital
Apart from the size of country territory, the degree of peripherality of the
capital qi is a key ingredient in our theory and in our empirical model. The
model predicts that rule of law should decrease with qi, holding country size
si constant. Hence, we also expect a negative sign of α2 in (7). Using data
from CEPII (2006) and CIA (2005), we have constructed a measure of the
distance in kilometers from the approximate center of the country to the
city hosting the seat of the government (which is usually also the capital).24
The measure is available for 120 countries in our ex-colony sample. The
countries with the greatest distances are not surprisingly the United States
and Canada. The natural logarithm of this score makes up LogDistance,
which is featured in Table 3. When run together with LogArea, LogDistance
is negative and signiﬁcant in column (1), and strongly signiﬁcant in column
(2) when featured alone. The distance measure is clearly correlated with
country area (larger countries like Brazil and Indonesia will, ceteris paribus,
have a greater absolute distance from center to capital), and the coeﬃcient in
column (2) where LogArea is excluded presumably picks up some of the eﬀect
of country size. Furthermore, LogDistance is clearly an imperfect proxy for
qi in the theory section which is a size-neutral index of the peripherality of
the capital.
We have therefore created a measure that, we believe, more clearly re-
ﬂects the degree of peripherality. We have done so by dividing our calculated
24The measure was produced by translating data on locations in latitude and longitude
degrees to distances in kilometers by employing the Great Circle Formula. See the Data
Appendix for the exact details.
18distance from center to capital by an approximate measure of the distance
from the center of the country to the border, where we approximate the
shape of all countries to be congruent to a circle as is common in the trade
literature (Head and Meyer, 2002) (see Data Appendix for the details). This
size-adjusted measure Periphery shows countries like Namibia and Costa
Rica as being among the very lowest scorers whereas the countries with the
most peripheral capitals include Mozambique and Benin. Figure 4 illustrates
the peripherality measure with respect to Namibia (with a score of 0.125)
and Mozambique (1.77).
The model predicts that the strength of rule of law should increase with
qi holding si constant, and in column (3) we try to accomplish a similar
scenario. As hypothesized, Periphery has a negative coeﬃcient and is sig-
niﬁcant (column 3) as well as when featured alone (column 4), although
these results are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of Somalia. LogArea
remains negative and highly signiﬁcant throughout all speciﬁcations. The
results in Table 3, column 3 predicts that when controlling for area, the
country with the most uncentrally located capital should have a Rule of
Law level that is 0.54 points lower (equivalent to 13 percent lower) than a
country with a perfectly centrally located capital. In summary, we believe
that Table 3 provides supporting evidence of the notion that the geograph-
ical peripherality of the capital should matter for the average intensity of
public goods like the rule of law.
4.4 Other determinants
In Table 4, we extend our set of control variables in C￿
i from just Latitude and
Neo-Europe to include several other variables that have been suggested in
the literature. Ethnic, cultural, and or religious fractionalization is an often
argued cause for diﬀerences in institutional quality and civil conﬂict (see for
example Alesina et al (2003), Easterly and Levine (1997), and Hibbs (1973)).
Recently, partly due to the revived interest in the eﬀects of fractionalization,
Alesina et al (2003) and Fearon (2003) have created new measures for diﬀer-
ent aspects of fractionalization. The measures Ethnic fractionalization from
Fearon (2003) (hereafter called Ethnicity1) and Ethnic and Religious frac-
tionalization (hereafter called Ethnicity2 and Religion) both from Alesina
et al (2003) are used as control variables in equation (7). As can be seen
from Table 4, the coeﬃcient for LogArea is still negative and statistically
19signiﬁcant, while controlling for the fractionalization measures. The coef-
ﬁcients for Ethnicity1 and Ethnicity2 are both positive and insigniﬁcant,
while the coeﬃcient for Religion is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.25
Before we leave the fractionalization measures, it is interesting to note that
the correlations between LogArea and the three fractionalization measures
are surprisingly low26. A large country, therefore, does not automatically
imply a more fractionalized country.
Since we have a sample of former colonies, variables related to colonial
heritage are obviously highly relevant. An often used variable is Acemoglu
et al’s (2001, 2002) famous proxy for settler mortality, constructed by using
data on the mortality of soldiers and bishops in tropical diseases during
colonial days. The hypothesis proposed by Acemoglu et al (2001) was that a
high settler mortality and a subsequent low intensity of European settlement
should have contributed to extractive, harmful colonial institutions that have
persisted to this day, and vice versa.27 The basic data on settler mortality
is only available for 69 former colonies, but when controlling for Log Settler
Mortality in Column (4) the coeﬃcient for LogArea is still negative and
signiﬁcant.
The other colonial variables are Duration of colonial rule (suggested by
Grier, 1999, and Price, 2003), Years of independence from colonial rule, a
dummy for the colonies that were Colonized after 1850 (mainly Africa), and
Legal Origin (as suggested by La Porta et al, 1999). Controlling for these
measures of colonial heritage does not alter the main results; the coeﬃcient
for LogArea is still negative and signiﬁcant in all regressions.
Further variables related to geography and natural resource endowments
are included in Table 5. Controlling for Island countries (deﬁned as coun-
tries with no land border), Landlocked countries, and Dependency countries
(countries that are not sovereign), does not alter the signiﬁcance of the co-
eﬃcient for LogArea. The negative relation between the size of nations and
Rule of Law is therefore not driven by small islands or dependency coun-
tries. Column 4 also shows that the coeﬃcient for LogArea is still negative
and signiﬁcant when including dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin
America.
25A similar result was obtained by Alesina et al (2003).
26The Pearson correlation coeﬃcients between LogArea and Ethnicity1, Ethnicity2, and
Religion, are respectively; 0.1735, 0.4441, and -0.0920.
27See Rodrik et al (2004) and Glaeser et al (2004) for further discussions of this work.
20Furthermore Table 5 shows that the negative relationship between Log-
Area and Rule of Law is also robust while controlling for natural resource
abundance. Column 5 includes countries which are major Oil exporters as
well as countries where Diamonds were discovered prior to 1989, and Col-
umn 6 controls for the ratio between energy and mineral depletion as a share
of GNI.
Although not shown, it is important to note that in the regression re-
sults above, Neo-Europe and Latitude are included in every regression. The
regressions above would also be robust to the inclusion LogOpenness.
4.5 Further Robustness Tests
The last three columns of Table 5 test the robustness of the relation be-
tween LogArea and Rule of Law even further. First of all, in column 7,
all the countries with a population less than 500’000 are excluded from the
regression, while at the same time controlling for Islands, Dependency, Neo-
Europe, and Latitude. But not even this hard test alters the signiﬁcance of
the coeﬃcient for LogArea.
In Column 8, we test for the robustness of the relationship between
LogArea and Rule of Law by considering potential measurement error in the
dependent variable. Our Rule of Law measure from Kaufmann et al (2005) is
a composite index based on several diﬀerent independent sources. Therefore,
attached to each country’s score is also the estimate’s standard error and how
many sources that has been used for that particular estimate. For the Rule
of Law 2004 estimate, the great majority of countries have a standard error
of between 0.1 and 0.2. A natural cut-oﬀ point would therefore preferably be
to exclude those countries with a standard error larger than 0.2. This turns
out to be almost the same as excluding those countries with less than six
independent sources28. As can be seen from Column 8, excluding countries
with a standard error larger than 0.2, while also controlling for Islands,
Dependency, Neo-Europe, and Latitude, the coeﬃcient for LogArea is still
negative and signiﬁcant.
The last regression in Table 5 uses Expropriation Risk as dependent
variable (see for example Acemoglu et al, 2001, and Osili and Paulson, 2004).
Expropriation Risk has often been used in the literature as a proxy for the
28Excluding countries with a standard error larger than 0.2 also excludes Burundi and
Eritrea, (compared to excluding countries with less than six sources).
21strength of property rights institutions in the same manner as Rule of law.
The Expropriation Risk data is retrieved from Acemoglu et al (2001) and
its usage reduces the sample size from 127 to 62 former colonies. However,
neither the change in dependent variable, nor the drastic reduction in sample
size alters the main result; the coeﬃcient for LogArea is still negative and
signiﬁcant.
Furthermore, the estimated coeﬃcient for LogArea in Table 2, column
1, is not statistically diﬀerent from any of the estimates coeﬃcients from
Table 4 or Table 5. We believe that these results strongly indicate that the
territorial size of nations is an important determinant of the rule of law and
of institutional choice in general.
5 Conclusions
In the spirit of Montesquieu, this paper demonstrates that there is a clear,
robust and signiﬁcant negative relationship between the size of nations and
the strength of rule of law for a large cross-section of countries. For for-
mer colonies, up to 60 percent of the variation in rule of law is explained
by the variables LogArea, Latitude, and NeoEurope. This strong negative
relationship is robust to the inclusion of a variety of control variables such
as trade openness, ethnic and religious fractionalization, settler mortality,
colonial heritage, and legal origin. The negative relation between LogArea
and Rule of Law is even robust to including the level of the population, sug-
gesting that country area is a stronger predictor of institutional quality than
population levels. We believe that these results strongly suggest that large
countries are seriously disadvantaged in the formation and maintenance of
institutions for economic development.
In our model, we further propose that the centrality of the capital should
play a vital role in the broadcasting of high quality institutions. We there-
fore construct a measure for the peripherality of the capital by relating the
distance in kilometers from the capital to the approximative center of the
country, to the distance from the center of the country to the border. As
predicated by our model, the centrality of the capital indeed appears to
be an important variable for explaining the variation in the Rule of Law.
We believe that the relationship between the location of the capital and the
country-wide provision of public goods is a potential area for future research.
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26Table 1: Regressions for various measures of institutional quality in 2004.  
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Notes: The superscript 
*** denotes significant at the 1% level,  
** significant at the 5% level, 
*  significant at the 10% level.  Standard errors in ( ), robust standard errors in [ ]. 
Robust standard errors have been used when the null-hypotheses of no heteroscedasticity according to White’s test could be rejected. Intercept included but not reported. 








 Table 2: Regressions for Rule of law in 2004 among former colonies using alternative measures of country size.  
 
  Dependent variable: Rule of law in 2004 
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n  127  127  127  97  127  97  127 
 
Notes: The superscript 
*** denotes significant at the 1% level,  
** significant at the 5% level, 
*  significant at the 
10% level.  Standard errors in ( ), robust standard errors in [ ]. Robust standard errors have been used when the 
null-hypotheses of no heteroscedasticity according to White’s test could be rejected. Intercept included but not 
reported. Estimated by OLS. 




























 Table 3: Testing for the centrality of the capital among former colonies.  
 
  Dependent variable: Rule of law in 2004 
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n 
 
120 120 95 95 
Notes: All estimations use OLS. The superscript 
*** denotes significant at the 1% level, 
** denotes significant at 
the 5% level, and 
* denotes significant at the 10% level. In parenthesis are standard errors. Intercept included but 
not reported. See data appendix for information on measurement and sample. Estimated by OLS. 
a: Excluding countries which are defined as an “island group”. See data appendix for further information. 
 
 
 Table 4: Controlling for Fractionalization and Colonial Heritage  
 
  Dependent variable: Rule of Law in 2004 
 
Independent  variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
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Ethnicity1    0.2986   
[0.2695] 
       
Ethnicity2     0.0866   
(0.2621) 
      
Religion        0.4032
*   
(0.2391) 
     
Log Settler Mortality           -0.2400
*** 
(0.0659) 
    
Duration of colonial rule                0.0010
**(a) 
(0.0004) 
   
Years of independence from colonial 
rule 
      0.0002     
(0.0011) 
  




Legal  Origin  UK  (dummy)                1.0949
*** 
(0.2115) 
Legal  Origin  France  (dummy)                0.9181
*** 
(0.2467) 
Legal Origin Socialist (dummy) 
 
        0 . 2 8 7 1  
(0.3654) 
R
2  0.4776 0.5228 0.5463 0.6516 0.5544 0.5360 0.5621 0.6041 
n  92  117 125  69  127 127 127 125 
Notes: All regressions include controls for neo-Europe and absolute latitude, all regressions except (8) also include a constant. The superscript 
*** denotes significant at the 1% 
level,  
** significant at the 5% level, 
*  significant at the 10% level.  Standard errors in ( ), robust standard errors in [ ], Robust standard errors have been used when the null-
hypotheses of no heteroscedasticity according to White’s test could be rejected (White, 1980). Intercept included but not reported. Estimated by OLS. 
a) All estimates have been rounded, the more exact parameter estimate for this heading is 0.0009717 with a standard error of  0.0004313  which gives a p-value of 0.026.   




Table 5: Geography and Natural Resources Controls 
 
  Dependent Variable: Rule of Law  Expropriation 
Risk 





***   
(0.0263) 
-0.1631
***   
(0.0186) 
-0.1525
***   
(0.0191) 
  -0.1551
***   
(0.0184) 
  -0.1768
***   
(0.0216) 
  -0.1537
***   





***   
(0.0398) 
-0.1545
*   
(0.0823) 
Island (dummy)  0.1323   
(0.1718) 
      0 . 2 4 2 7  
[0.1982] 
0.3559   
(0.2265) 
 
Landlocked (dummy)    -0.2687
*   
(0.1585) 
        
Dependency (dummy)        0.6358
**   
(0.2505) 




*   
(0.6494) 
 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  (dummy)      -0.2606
*   
(0.1341) 
      
Latin America (dummy)        0.1920   
(0.1345) 
      
Oil Exporter (dummy)          0.0960   
(0.1891) 
      
Diamonds discovered prior to 1989 
(dummy) 
     0.1331     
(0.1481) 
      
Energy and Mineral depletion/GNI 
2001 
 
      -0.0527     
(0.5376)    
    
R
2  0.5382 0.5466 0.5592 0.5736 0.5407 0.5359 0.5038  0.5304 0.3630 
n  127 127 127 127 122 111  97  90 62 
Notes:  All regressions include an intercept and controls for Neo-Europe and Latitude. The superscript 
*** denotes significant at the 1% level,  
** significant at the 5% level, 
*  
significant at the 10% level.  Standard errors in ( ), robust standard errors in [ ], Robust standard errors have been used when the null-hypotheses of no heteroscedasticity 
according to White’s test could be rejected. Estimated by OLS.  
a: Countries with a population less than 500’000 are excluded from the regression 
b: The countries whose Rule of Law estimates standard error is in excess of 0.2 are excluded from the regression.  
c: Expropriation risk is the dependent variable, taken from Acemoglu et al (2001), hence the smaller sample size. 
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Log Area
coef = -.16655692, (robust) se = .01566617, t = -10.63
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Log Area
coef = -.1693381, se = .0183216, t = -9.24

































































Notes: Maps retrieved from CIA World FactbookSummary Statistics  
All the World Sample 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Rule of Law  208  0.0000  1.0000  -2.3068  2.0124 
Political Stability  207  0.0000  1.0000  -2.8718  1.7696 
Voice & Accountability  207  0.0000  1.0000  -2.1875  1.5851 
Gov’t Effectiveness  209  0.0000  1.0000  -2.3204  2.2523 
Regulatory Quality  204  0.0000  1.0000  -2.6269  2.0159 
Control of Corruption  204  0.0000  1.0000  -1.6488  2.5301 
Log Area  209  10.8734  3.0395  0.6678  16.6546 
Neo-Europe 209  0.0191  0.1373  0.0000  1.0000 
Abs Latitude  209  24.6153  16.5380  0.0000  65.0000 
          
Former Colony Sample 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Rule of Law  127  -0.2194  0.8876  -2.3068  1.9258 
Rule of Law se  127  0.1786  0.0749  0.1135  0.7105 
Rule of Law n  127  9.2047  4.4496  1.0000  17.0000 
Total  area  127 680882 1634000  21  9984670 
Population  127 27800000 101000000  10299 1050000000 
Pop.  density  127 368.8476 1738.9860  1.9093 17765.6700 
Open 97  0.8242  0.4662  0.2363  2.9331 
Log Area  127  10.9877  3.0812  3.0445  16.1166 
Log Population  127  15.0881  2.3000  9.2398  20.7762 
Log Population Density  127  4.1004  1.6508  0.6467  9.7850 
Log Open  97  -0.3360  0.5369  -1.4426  1.0761 
Log Distance  120  4.9640  1.4520  0.9285  7.6325 
Periphery 95  0.8269  0.4434  0  2.1631 
Ethnicity1 92  0.5522  0.2536  0.0395  1.0000 
Ethnicity2 117  0.4932  0.2601  0.0000  0.9302 
Religious Fractionalization  125  0.4621  0.2427  0.0023  0.8603 
Log Settler Mortality  69  4.685  1.2171  2.1459  7.9862 
Duration of Colonial Rule  127  173.1890  126.5852  38.0000  513.0000 
Years of Independence  127  62.7638  57.3785  0.0000  228.0000 
Colonized after 1850  127  0.5197  0.5016  0.0000  1.0000 
Legal Origin UK  125  0.4640  0.5007  0.0000  1.0000 
Legal Origin France  125  0.4960  0.5020  0.0000  1.0000 
Legal Origin Socialist  125  0.0400  0.1967  0.0000  1.0000 
Island 127  0.2992  0.4597  0.0000  1.0000 
Landlocked 127  0.1417  0.3502  0.0000  1.0000 
Dependency 127  0.0551  0.2291  0.0000  1.0000 
Sub-Saharan Africa  127  0.3465  0.4777  0.0000  1.0000 
Latin America  127  0.2756  0.4486  0.0000  1.0000 
Oil Exporter  122  0.0984  0.2990  0.0000  1.0000 
Diamonds discovered <1989  122  0.2459  0.4324  0.0000  1.0000 
Energy & Mineral Depletion/GNI 2001  111  0.0484  0.1075  0.0000  0.5462 
Expropriation Risk  62  6.5173   1.4865  3.5000  10.0000 
 Variable Description 
Rule of Law  Rule of Law, Source Kaufmann et al (2005) 
Rule of Law se  Standard Error of Rule of Law measure, Source Kaufmann et al (2005) 
Rule of Law n  Number of sources per estimate, Source Kaufmann et al (2005) 
Political Stability  Political Instability and Violence, Source Kaufmann et al (2005) 
Voice & Accountability  Voice and Accountability, Source Kaufmann et al (2005) 
Gov’t Effectiveness  Government Effectiveness, Source Kaufmann et al (2005) 
Regulatory Quality  Regulatory Quality, Source Kaufmann et al (2005) 
Control of Corruption  Control of Corruption, Source Kaufmann et al (2005) 
Neo-Europe  Dummy variable, =1 if Australia, Canada, New Zealand, or the USA 
Abs Latitude  Absolute latitude degree. From: CIA World Factbook 2005, 
Total area  Total area (including lakes and  rivers) in sq km, Source CIA World Fac book 2005 
Population  Total Population (2002), Source UNSTATS 
Pop. density  Total population divided by total area in sq km 
Log Area  Natural logarithm of total area 
Log Population  Natural logarithm of population 
Log Population Density  Natural logarithm of population density 
Open 
 
Open=(exports + imports)/GDP, all from 2002 in current prices local currency units. 
Source World Development Indicators 2004 
Log Open  Natural logarithm of open 
Ethnicity1  Ethnic Fractionalization. From Fearon (2003) 
Ethnicity2  Ethnic Fractionalization. Covers the period1979-2001. From Alesina et al (2003) 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
Religious Fractionalization, for 2001. From Alesina et al (2003) 
 
Log Settler Mortality  Natural logarithm of Settler Mortality, from Acemoglu et al (2000) 
Duration of Colonial 
Rule 
Duration of colonial rule. Year of independence (max 2004) minus year of 
colonialization. Own assessment 
Years of Independence 
 
Years of independence since colonialization. 2004 minus year of independence. Own 
assessment. 
Colonized after 1850  Dummy variable. =1 if colonized after the year 1850. Own assessment. 
Legal Origin UK  Legal Origin British, From La Porta et al (1999) 
Legal Origin France  Legal Origin French From La Porta et al (1999) 
Legal Origin Socialist  Legal Origin Socialist, From La Porta et al (1999)  
Island 
 
Dummy variable. =1 if Island. An Island is defined as a country with no land boundary. 
Based on “land boundary” from CIA World Factbook 2005. 
Landlocked  Dummy variable. =1 if country is landlocked. From CIA World Factbook 2005 
Dependency 
 
Dummy variable. =1 if country is not independent, not its own sovereignty. From CIA 
World Factbook 2005 
Sub-Saharan Africa  Dummy variable. =1 if country is part of Sub-Saharan Africa 
Latin America  Dummy variable. =1 if country is part of Latin America 
Oil Exporter 
 




Dummy variable. =1 if Diamonds discovered in country prior 1989. From Lujala, 
Gleditsch, Gilmore (2005) 
Energy & Mineral 
Depletion/GNI 2001 
 
Energy (crude oil, natural gas, and coal) and Mineral (bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead, 
nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, and zinc) depletion as a share of GNI 1999. From World 
Bank data on Adjusted Net Savings. 


























Natural logarithm of the distance in kilometers from the Seat of the Government (data 
from CEPII, 2006) to the approximate center of the country (CIA, 2005). Calculated by 
Great Circle Distance Formula (see  http://mathworld.wolfram.com/GreatCircle.html, 
and; http://www.meridianworlddata.com/Distance-Calculation-asp) 
 
Step 1: Retrieve the coordinates for the two locations, expressed in decimal degrees. 
Step 2: Convert all latitude and longitude degrees into radians by taking the decimal 
degree/(180/pi). Define the first coordinate as “lat1” and “lon1” and the second 
coordinate as “lat2” and “lon2”. 
Step 3:calculate according to Great Circle Formula: 
distance=r*arccos*[sin(lat1)*sin(lat2)+cos(lat1)*cos(lat2)*cos(lon2-lon1)] 
 
Where r=6378.7, the radius of the earth in kilometers 
 
Macau, Guinea, Kuwait, The Gambia, Saint Lucia where excluded due to erroneous 
data in either capital or approximate center coordinate. Nauru and Micronesia both have 















Measure of uncentrality of the capital. Periphery equals the distance from center to 
capital (as calculated above) divided by the square root of total area divided by pi. The 
Shape of all countries is here assumed to be described as a circle, and where (total 
area/pi)
1/2 is the radius of that circle, hence the distance from the center to the border. 
 
Countries which we defined as “island group” has been excluded. Island groups are the 
countries which shape least can be approximated as a circle. Countries classified as 
Island group: Antigua and Barbuda; The Bahamas; Comoros; Cape Verde; Cayman 
Islands; Fiji; Micronesia; Grenada; Kiribati; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Maldives; Marshall 
Islands; New Zealand; Philippines; Solomon Islands; Sao Tome and Principe; 
Seychelles; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; Tuvalu; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; 
Vanuatu; Samoa. Countries similar to island group (also excluded): Equatorial Guinea; 
Indonesia; Malaysia; Panama. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 